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I. INTRODUCTION
At 6:15 a.m. in a small, rural South Florida town, the sun has barely
broken the eastern horizon, and a blanket of humidity slowly suffocates
the sweet scent of freshly born citrus blossoms. Jimmy, an eighteen-
year-old honors student, gives a fourth go at starting his car. Anxious to
get to class on time, he hurries inside the house to his twenty-two year
old brother's room. "Mike, my car won't start. Can I use yours today?
Just this once. I promise," he pleads. Mike, still hidden under the com-
fort of covers and shadows of curtains closed tightly, grunts in approval.
Jimmy whisks away Mike's keys and shouts a hurried thanks, dashing
out the front door to the driveway.
Somewhere before reaching school, Jimmy spots an alternating
assault of blue and red lights in the rear view mirror. He pulls over,
wondering why his day-just like his own car's engine-won't
1. Managing Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2013, University of
Miami School of Law; B.S.F.S. 2008, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University. Written with gratitude to my incredibly supportive and inspirational parents. A special
thank you to my professors, including Irwin Stotzky, Susan Bennett, Terence Anderson, Michael
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smoothly start. After a documentary exchange, the officer cites Jimmy
for a broken taillight. But the officer recognizes this car, and announces
that he'll need to take a peek inside. Without hesitation, Jimmy agrees.
Tapping his feet on the grassy shoulder and focused on the day's aca-
demic adventures ahead, Jimmy wonders if he'll make it to his computer
science class on time.
Thoughts of keyboard strokes and mouse clicks are quickly inter-
rupted by the unexpected clank of handcuffs. The officer finds Mike's
backpack in the passenger seat, which contains a bottle of Valium with
the prescription label crudely scraped off.2 Instead of heading to school,
Jimmy is taken into custody for violating section 893.13 of the Florida
Statutes, the state's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
("DAPCA").3
Jimmy, standing confused and alone in the concrete confines of the
local jail, mirrored the past position of Florida's primary controlled sub-
stances law: an unconstitutional exception reflecting confusion and
prompting discord at every level of the state's judiciary system.
Freedom of contact, a fundamental principle espoused by our
founding fathers, can turn criminal all too easily in the face of Florida's
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Under DAPCA, Florida
became the only state in the nation expressly to eliminate mens rea as an
element of a drug offense.4 Thus, DAPCA's propositions and penalties
touch the lives of every Floridian-almost ironically, whether they
touch an illegal substance or not. This article biographies the birth of
DAPCA, examines its sudden fame over the past year, and explains why
the Florida Supreme Court erroneously upheld DAPCA. Part I chroni-
cles DAPCA's creation in the face of conflict between Florida's legisla-
tive and judiciary organs. Part II recounts the recent reexamination of
the Act's constitutionality and conflicting treatment amongst Florida
courts. Part III analyzes the Act's effects on law, practice, and practical-
ity for Florida's justice system. Part IV reviews the importance of the
DAPCA decision, evaluates the tools and techniques that Florida's
Supreme Court used in heralding DAPCA, and discusses why the Court
should have dealt the Act a constitutionally necessary and fatal blow.
2. See State v. Washington, 18 Fla. Weekly Supp. 1129 (Fla. 1 th Cir. Ct. August 17, 2011)
(Judge Milton Hirsch proposed a similar hypothetical.).
3. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1997).
4. Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2011), rev'd,
No.11-13515, 2012 WL 3641008 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).
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II. FLORIDA'S DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT:
CHILD OF CONFLICT
On December 6, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ments in State v. Adkins, marking the third time the Court has contem-
plated the necessity of a mens rea requirement in Florida's drug
possession and delivery laws.5 A walk through the bitter battle between
Florida's courts and legislature sets the stage for the importance of and
need for finality established by the Supreme Court's ruling.
Prior to May 2002, Florida's primary drug control statute read as
follows:
(1)(a) Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 499, it is
unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess
with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.
Any person who violates this provision with respect to:
1. A controlled substance named or described... commits a felony
of the second degree ....
(6) (a) It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive
possession of a controlled substance unless such controlled substance
was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid pre-
scription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his or
her professional practice to be in actual or constructive possession of
a controlled substance except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
Any person who violates this provision commits a felony in the third
degree .... 6
In seeing that the statute lacked a knowledge requirement, the Florida
Supreme Court chimed in: "We believe it was the intent of the legisla-
ture to prohibit the knowing possession of illicit items . . . .Thus, we
hold that the State was required to prove that [a defendant] knew of the
illicit nature of the items in his possession."7 In Chicone v. State, one of
two cases prompting later action by the Florida legislature, the Florida
Supreme Court further held that the trial court erred in denying the
defendant's request for a special jury instruction addressing knowledge
of the illicit nature of the substances at issue.8
Six years later, in 2002, the Florida Supreme Court once again
highlighted the need for a knowledge requirement. In Scott v. State, the
Court not only reiterated its holding in Chicone, but also declared that
5. State v. Adkins, No. SCI 1 1878, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla. July 12, 2012). The Florida
Supreme Court first undertook constitutional challenges to DAPCA in Chicone v. State, 684 So.
2d 736 (Fla. 1997), and again in Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2002).
6. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1997).
7. Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 744 (Fla. 1996).
8. Id. at 746.
2012]
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"knowledge is an element of the crime of possession of a controlled
substance," that "a defendant is entitled to an instruction on that ele-
ment," and that "it is error to fail to give an instruction even if the defen-
dant did not explicitly say he did not have knowledge of the illicit nature
of the substance." 9
By early 2002, the Florida Supreme Court voiced its opinion loudly
and clearly. But a few months later, the Florida legislature, in "direct
and express response" to Chicone and Scott, contravened the Court's
conclusion and reacted by enacting amendments to DAPCA, codified as
section 893.101 of the Florida Statutes.10
Florida Statute § 893.101 became effective May 13, 2002:
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State . . . and
Chicone v. State ... holding that the state must prove that the
defendant knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance
found in his or her actual or constructive possession, were con-
trary to legislative intent.
(2) The legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a con-
trolled substance is not an element of any offense under this
chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled
substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter.
(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative
defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled
substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a per-
missive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature
of the substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those
cases where such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall
be instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this
subsection."
In one sweeping motion, the Florida legislature flouted the state judici-
ary by transforming possession into a general intent crime, eliminating
the mens rea requirement, and shifting the responsibilities of both State
and defendant. The State no longer had to prove that the violator was
aware of the contraband's illegal nature. The DAPCA amendment also
forced the defendant to assert lack of knowledge as an affirmative
defense, rather than an essential element of the crime to be proved by the
State."2 The recharacterization of knowledge as an affirmative defense
was a "caveat" rather than a remedy-"[o]nce this door is opened...
possession of the controlled substance will give rise to a permissive pre-
sumption that the possessor knew of the substance's illicit nature, and
9. Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 170-72 (Fla. 2002).
10. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1294.
11. FLA. STAT. § 893.101 (2002).
12. Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
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the jury instructions will include this presumption." 3 The defendant, in
asserting knowledge as an affirmative defense, now faced a two-fold
danger: First, that the jury would hear the presumption of knowledge,
and second, a heightened difficulty in rebutting both the presumption
and its accompanying prejudice.14
III. RECOUNTING THE ACT'S RECENT RISE TO FAME
Nearly a decade later, in July, 2011, the conflict between Florida's
judicial and legislative branches-a sleeping giant of statewide propor-
tion-was reawakened once again. Florida's state and federal courts
began to stir over DAPCA's constitutionality, focusing primarily on its
relation to a defendant's Due Process rights.
A. The Storm Reawakens: Shelton v. Secretary,
Department of Corrections
"'Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea'-except in Florida,"
wrote Judge Mary Scriven, opening her opinion in Shelton v. Secretary,
Department of Corrections with a bold declaration of the eyebrow-rais-
ing uniqueness of the state's Act.1 5 Her decision, arising from the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, "produced a cate-
gory-five hurricane in the Florida criminal practice community."' 6 Judge
Scriven characterized the 2002 DAPCA amendment as a "draconian and
unreasonable construction of the law" that refashioned the statute into a
strict liability crime "without regard to whether [someone delivered a
controlled substance] purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negli-
gently."' 7 Accordingly, because it stripped the statute of a mens rea
requirement, Judge Scriven held that DAPCA was both unconstitutional
and violative of the Due Process Clause.
1 8
Unlike Jimmy, this article's innocent and unknowing protagonist,
the defendant, Mackle Vincent Shelton, was harmed under the Act for a
different reason. Shelton was arrested in 2004 and charged with eight
counts, including the delivery of cocaine. 19 Pursuant to the post-2002
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1293. ("The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind
also be guilty.")
16. Washington, supra note 2 at 1129.
17. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
18. See id. at 1297.
19. Id. at 1295. In addition to the delivery charge, Shelton was charged with three counts of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, one count of fleeing or attempting to elude a law
enforcement officer, driving while license suspended, reckless driving causing damage to a
property or person, and two counts of criminal mischief. Id.
2012]
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DAPCA amendment of § 893.101, Florida Statutes, the jury was not
instructed that knowledge was an element to the offense. Instead, under
the revised DAPCA, Shelton was dealt the burden of rebutting the pre-
sumption of knowledge by raising an affirmative defense. Shelton was
convicted of the delivery charge without the jury being required to con-
sider his intent.20
Instead, the state had to prove only two elements beyond a reasona-
ble doubt: "[1] that Mackle Vincent Shelton delivered a certain sub-
stance; and [2] that the substance was cocaine. 21 Shelton's appeals were
denied by both the trial court and Florida's Fifth District Court of
Appeal, and arrived in federal court through his petition for federal
habeas corpus relief.22 Lower courts ignored Shelton's claim that
DAPCA was unlawfully transforming the state law into a strict liability
offense by eliminating a mens rea requirement. Yet Judge Scriven
found this claim too important to be ignored, and found DAPCA facially
unconstitutional.24
The Shelton court found it impermissible that "[u]nder Florida's
statute, that conduct is rendered immediately criminal if it turns out that
the substance is a controlled substance, without regard to the deliverer's
knowledge or intent. ' 25 First, Judge Scriven stressed that the mens rea
requirement for proving guilt in criminalized conduct "is firmly rooted
in Supreme Court jurisprudence. ' 26 Citing powerful language in Moris-
sette v. United States, Judge Scriven emphasized "it is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil. '27 Judge Scriven further underscored the
inextricable relation of a mens rea requirement to American criminal
jurisprudence:
A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harm-
ful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But
I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and
unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of
retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.
To constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious will."
28
20. See id. at 1293.
21. Id. at 1296.
22. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 1305.
26. Id. at 1297.





The Shelton court continued its espousal of a vicious will requirement
by pointing to states like North Dakota and Louisiana, whose Supreme
Courts have recognized the necessity of the mens rea requirement.2 9
Shifting focus and setting her sights on the Florida legislature,
Judge Scriven proceeded to acknowledge the freedom of state legisla-
tures to enact strict liability crimes, "but not without severe constraints
and constitutional safeguards."30 The story of Shelton recognized that
"rare" occasion when a legislature is silent to a knowledge requirement,
giving rise to a judicial responsibility to "engraft a knowledge require-
ment to cure the state's infirmity and follow the common-law presump-
tion" barring punishment without proof of knowledge.3 In the legacy of
Chicone and Scott, Shelton represented another attempt by Florida courts
to cure the faults of the Florida legislature.
In analyzing the constitutionality of DAPCA, Judge Scriven looked
to the Supreme Court's decision in Staples v. United States.3" The
Staples court held that a mens rea requirement is a rule rather than an
exception when a statute is otherwise silent.33 This requirement was nec-
essary for two reasons: First, to protect punishment of the innocent, and
second, to protect from stigma associated with hard penalties.34
The Staples standard for strict liability crimes applies a three-prong
test holding strict liability crimes constitutional only if: (1) the penalty
imposed is slight; (2) if a conviction does not result in substantial
stigma; and (3) if the statute regulates inherently dangerous or deleteri-
ous conduct.35 Before applying the Staples test, Judge Scriven noted that
strict liability offenses are usually "accorded a generally disfavored sta-
tus," unless enacted for public welfare regulating "inherently dangerous
items/conduct and which provide for only slight penalties, such as fines
or short jail sentences. 36
Shelton showed that DAPCA clearly fails each of the three prongs
promulgated in Staples. Under the first prong-if the penalty imposed is
slight-the penalty under DAPCA is contrastingly substantial. Those
found guilty under DAPCA face a second-degree felony warranting up
29. Since 1989, the culpability requirement of "willfully" has been an element of the offense
of possession of a controlled substance. State v. Bell, 649 N.W. 2d 243, 252 (N.D. 2002). The
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that crafting possession law into a strict liability crime
impermissibly allowed an innocent person to be convicted "without ever being aware of the nature
of the substance he was given." State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 51 (La. 1980).
30. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
31. Id.
32. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
33. See id. at 605.'
34. See id. at 616.
35. See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
36. Id. at 1300.
20121
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to fifteen years' imprisonment, while habitual offenders face up to thirty
years with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. 37 "No strict liability
statute carrying penalties of the magnitude of [the Act] has ever been
upheld under federal law," noted Judge Scriven.38 She points to United
States v. Heller, where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated an
interstate kidnapping statute that, like DAPCA, lacked a mens rea
requirement and imposed a twenty-year maximum penalty.39 The Heller
court held that mens rea element must be inferred by judicial construc-
tion as not to offend Due Process: "[I]f Congress attempted to define a
malum prohibitum offense that placed an onerous stigma on an
offender's reputation and that carried a severe penalty, the Constitution
would be offended . ". .."" Accordingly, the Shelton court held that "the
penalties imposed by Florida's strict liability drug statute are too severe
to pass constitutional muster.. . doubly so when considered in conjunc-
tion with the other two factors."'"
By branding both first-time and habitual offenders as felons,
DAPCA fails the second prong of the Staples test, too. The Shelton court
found that punishment under the Act resulted in substantial stigma.
"There can be little question that a conviction for a second degree felony
coupled with a sentence of fifteen to thirty years tends to 'gravely
besmirch' a person's reputation."42 Judge Scriven highlighted everyday
personal and professional privileges enjoyed by most citizens but denied
outright to felons-vote, sit on a jury, serve in public office, obtain cer-
tain professional licenses, and receive federal student loans.4 3 "The label
of 'convicted felon' combined with a proclamation that the defendant is
so vile that he must be separated from society for fifteen to thirty years,
creates irreparable damage to the defendant's reputation and standing in
the community," noted Judge Scriven."4 Thus, the stigma dealt by
DAPCA is anything but slight.
Florida's Act ultimately fails the third and final prong of the
37. See id.
38. Id. at 1300. Circuits have varied in deciding of how long a sentence for a strict liability
crime is too long. One example includes the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which, like DAPCA, also
lacks a knowledge requirement. See United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding maximum penalty two years' imprisonment as unconstitutional under the felony
provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act); see also United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 at 435
(3rd Cir. 1986) (holding two years' imprisonment as permissible, only as a part of a regulatory
measure "in the interest of public safety, which may well be premised on the theory that one
would hardly be surprised to learn that [the prohibited conduct] is not an innocent act.").
39. United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1978).
40. Id. at 994.






Staples test. The statute does not regulate inherently dangerous conduct;
in fact, it does just the opposite by regulating innocent conduct. Judge
Scriven looked to the most significant and final failure of DAPCA under
two lenses: First, unnecessarily broad criminalization, and second, a
threat to traditional forms of societal interaction. Under the first lens, the
Shelton court looked to jurisprudential history on types of strict liability
statutes found unconstitutional: "Where laws proscribe conduct that is
neither inherently dangerous nor likely to be regulated, the Supreme
Court has consistently either invalidated them or construed them to
require proof of mens rea in order to avoid criminalizing 'a broad range
of apparently innocent conduct."' 45 Simply put, DAPCA cannot survive
constitutional scrutiny in relation to the conduct it regulates-the deliv-
ery of any substance.46 The Shelton court supported its opposition to
DAPCA's catch-all criminalization by pointing to the long tradition of
the exchange of goods in all forms of human interaction, including pub-
lic transportation, commerce, schools, and work. The Shelton court then
contrasted the possession and delivery of illicit goods with Supreme
Court precedent on inherently dangerous conduct like possession of
hand grenades47 and selling poisoned food,48 concluding that DAPCA
still fails to pass constitutional muster.49
Judge Scriven then turned her attention to the State, who contended
that DAPCA does not constitute a strict liability offense because the
defendant can raise lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense. She
held that the affirmative defense option did not transform the statute into
something other than strict liability and, instead, leaves the State
"hoisted on its own petard."5 The legislature further acted unconstitu-
tionally in prompting the State to shift the burden of proof of the essen-
tial mens rea element to the defendant, because the State's responsibility
45. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (holding that state legislatures were
bound by constitutional constraints; specifically, the charged offense of unlawfully acquiring food
stamps required proof that the accused knew the stamps were acquired unlawfully.).
46. See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. at 1305.
47. See generally United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (upholding a ten-year
maximum sentence for possession of hand grenades without a mens rea requirement because "one
would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.").
48. See generally United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) ("Where one deals with
others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison,
the policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punishment of the
negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells.").
49. See Shelton, 802 F. Supp. at 1305. Judge Scriven later wrote that because the statute,
amongst other reasons, "regulates and punishes otherwise innocuous conduct without proof of
knowledge or other criminal intent, the Court finds it violates the due process clause and that the
statute is unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 1308.
50. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
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firmly remains to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.5
Judge Scriven contended that characterizing mens rea as an affirmative
defense "purport[ed] to dispense with the fundamental precept underly-
ing the American system of justice-the presumption of innocence. 52
In sum, DAPCA forces the charged, innocent or not, to make a Hob-
son's Choice: Plead guilty, or go to trial where he is presumed guilty
because he is in fact guilty of the statute's two elements; then, because
the state presumes knowledge, having to overcome the seemingly insur-
mountable obstacle of proving his innocence for lack of that unconstitu-
tionally presumed knowledge.53 Through her decision in Shelton, Judge
Scriven boldly "decline[d] to grant the State broad, sweeping, authority"
to improperly eliminate the mens rea requirement in Florida's drug laws,
declaring DAPCA unconstitutional and igniting an impetus for statewide
change.54
B. A Change in Direction: Cook v. United States and
United States v. Bunton
Nearly two months after Judge Scriven charged the legislature with
an unconstitutional stripping of rights in Shelton, a second Middle Dis-
trict authority, Judge Elizabeth Kovachevich, altered the course for
change in Cook v. United States. Myron Bobo Cook was found guilty of
three charges: One count of conspiracy to possess with intent to dis-
tribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, and two counts of posses-
sion with intent to distribute crack cocaine.55 Cook sought to amend his
motion to vacate based on Shelton, contending that he was innocent of
his convictions under DAPCA. 6 Cook argued that he had one calendar
year from the time his prior conviction was vacated to file his motion.
57
However, Judge Kovachevich rejected Cook's claims, sending him to
state court to obtain relief before the District Court would consider
granting relief by Shelton.58
Although the Cook court argued its denial of the appellant's motion
on procedurally time-barred grounds, its recognition of but refusal to
adopt the landmark decision in Shelton foreshadowed the blanket denial
51. See United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952); see also United States v.
Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1127 (11 th Cir. 2004) ("A defendant is never obligated to prove
anything to a jury.").
52. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
53. See id. at 1308.
54. Id.
55. See Cook v. United States, Nos. 8:02-cr-243-T-17MAP, 8:11-cv-1113-T-17MAP,
2011 WL 4435084, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2011).





and disagreement over DAPCA's constitutionality in Florida's state
courts. Instead of boldly siding with Shelton and, in doing so, strengthen
support for the law's unconstitutionality, Judge Kovachevich simply
glossed over the Act's unconstitutionality, effectively passing the buck
for later courts to decide. 9
A few weeks after the Cook court declined to follow Shelton, a
second Middle District judge issued an opinion contradicting the contro-
versial Shelton holding. In United States v. Bunton, Judge James Moody
held that DAPCA comported with the Due Process Clause, primarily
because the Act regulated a public welfare offense.6" Accordingly, Judge
Moody found that a mens rea element was not required.6" From a policy
perspective, the Bunton court emphasized the Act's importance and
effectiveness in fighting the "war on drugs."62 Further, Judge Moody felt
that knowledge was a reasonable inference.63 Judge Moody recognized
the possibility of criminalizing truly innocent conduct, but felt the
affirmative defense of lack of knowledge "help[ed] ameliorate this con-
cern" and "d[id] not violate due process by abrogating the State's burden
of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' Instead,
Judge Moody took solace in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions: "'If
you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether (defendant)
knew of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, you should find
(defendant) not guilty."' 65 But jury instructions are not an adequate safe-
guard of a defendant's constitutional rights when Due Process violations
are possibly in play.
C. Disagreement and Discord: Split Amongst the Florida Circuits
Yet disagreement over DAPCA was not confined to the District
Courts; simultaneously, state courts from the Panhandle to the Ever-
glades wrangled with the right way to interpret the Act following the
Shelton call for change.
59. See id. at *5. Judge Kovachevich, instead of considering the constitutionality of DAPCA
under Shelton, merely mentions Shelton as the basis for Cook's motion to amend his motion to
vacate.
60. See United States v. Bunton, No. 8: 10-cr-327-T-30EAJ, 2011 WL 5080307, at *8 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 26, 2011).
61. See id. "In light of this surviving element of knowledge and upon consideration of
Supreme Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of public welfare offenses, the Court
holds that [DAPCA] comports with the Due Process Clause . Id. at * 1.
62. Id. at *8.
63. Id. "It bears repeating that common sense dictates.., that one can reasonably infer guilty
knowledge when a defendant is in possession of an illegal substance and knows of the substance's
presence." Id.
64. Id., citing Burnette v. State, 901 So. 2d 925, 927-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
65. Id. at *9, citing In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 969 So. 2d 245 (Fla.
2007).
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1. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: Two SIDES OF THE SAME BENCH
In the three months after Shelton, courts statewide quickly acted in
both affirmance and denial of the Middle District holding. The Eleventh
Judicial Circuit found its judges in direct disagreement, while judges in
the First, Second, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal struggled to
reach a consensus on the constitutionality of DAPCA.
During the second week of August 2011, the Eleventh Judicial Cir-
cuit in Miami-Dade County found itself straddling both sides of the
DAPCA constitutionality debate. Supporting Shelton was Judge Milton
Hirsch, who wrote a total espousal of Judge Scriven's recommendations
in State v. Washington.66 In opposition was Judge Jorge Cueto, who
eviscerated Shelton's treatment of the Act in State v. Anderson.6 7
Judge Cueto's decision expressly "decline[d] the Defendant's invi-
tation to ignore the very law that [the] Court ha[d] been sworn to
uphold. '68 Instead, Judge Cueto cited State v. Dwyer, holding that the
Middle District decision in Shelton was not binding: "A decision of a
Federal District Court, while persuasive if well reasoned, is not by any
means binding on the courts of the state," and that only the state's
Supreme Court could definitively hold DAPCA constitutional or other-
wise.6 9 Judge Cueto further noted that even if a federal court rejected a
state law's constitutionality based on a Staples analysis, especially in the
absence of guidance from the state's Supreme Court, the state court's
ruling will hold "unless or until the United States Supreme Court
decides the issue."70 Judge Cueto's observation foreshadowed the cases
to come.
The Anderson court interpreted Shelton as inapplicable to state
courts in light of the District Courts of Appeal's adoption of the Act's
constitutionality. "Every District Court of Appeal," Cueto claimed, "has
examined the constitutionality of section 893.13, Florida Statutes, and
determined that the statute is constitutional both on state and federal
constitutional grounds. 71 Judge Cueto pointed to Johnson v. State, in
which the First District Court of Appeal held that the Staples analysis
was inapplicable, because Florida's legislative intent was "clearly
66. See Washington, supra note 2 at 1129. Judge Hirsch's decision would provide a strong
theoretical foundation and linguistic elucidation for Florida Supreme Court Justice Perry's future
dissent. See Part V.C, infra.
67. See State v. Anderson, No. F99-12435(A), 2011 WL 3904082 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 11,
2011).
68. Id.





expressed" in section 893.13.72 He further illustrated the District Courts
of Appeal's support for the Act with Wright v. State, where the Fourth
District Court of Appeal found the statute constitutional under state and
federal grounds, particularly because of "the rational relationship
between the governmental interest in addressing the drug problem and
the elimination of the difficult-to-prove element of knowledge of a sub-
stance's illicit nature."73 Later decisions by the District Courts of Appeal
acknowledged the legislature's broad discretion in crafting the Act, as
well as its constitutionality with regard to the greater goal of public
policy.
74
While the Anderson court remained steadfast in its adherence to
Florida precedent and hesitant to side with Shelton, it is notable that the
District Courts of Appeal decisions from which Cueto based his opinion
were from 2005,75 2006,76 and 2007. 77 The bitter battle within Florida's
Eleventh Circuit and the growing frequency of the issue's appearance in
the District Courts of Appeal represented an increasingly loud call for
change, and amplified the need for a definitive decision by the Florida
Supreme Court.
Only six days after Anderson, Judge Milton Hirsch made wake in
the Eleventh Circuit.78 Before him were thirty-nine defendants, all
charged with violations under DAPCA.79 Judge Hirsch predicted and
acknowledged "a storm-surge of pretrial motions" following the Shelton
decision, and accordingly consolidated the cases before him in an effort
to make a bold and striking statement about the Act's constitutionality.8 °
The Washington court walked through the Shelton court's Staples analy-
sis, finding DAPCA's failure to meet the first two factors "uncompli-
cated and incontrovertible."8 Judge Hirsch's disembowelment of
72. Johnson v. State, 37 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that the Staples analysis
applied only when the intent of the state legislature was not explicit in its reasoning for
eliminating the mens rea requirement).
73. Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21, 23-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
74. Judge Cueto references Harris v. State, 932 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (quoting
State v. Grey, 435 So. 2d 816, 819-20 (Fla. 1983); "If is within the power of the legislature to
declare conduct criminal without requiring specific criminal intent to achieve a certain result; that
is, the legislature may punish conduct without regard to the mental attitude of the offender, so that
the general intent of the accused to do the act is deemed to give rise a presumption of intent to
achieve the criminal results.").
75. See Burnette, supra note 64.
76. See Harris v. State, 932 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
77. See Taylor v. State, 929 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), rev. denied, 952 So. 2d 1191
(Fla. 2007).
78. Washington, supra note 2. Judge Hirsch issued his order on August 17, 2011. Id. Judge
Cueto's Anderson order was issued on August 11. Anderson, supra note 67.
79. See Washington, supra note 2 at 1129.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1130.
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DAPCA was founded on its dangerously broad criminalization of
"inherently innocuous, rather than ... inherently dangerous" activity:
8 2
"[DAPCA] does not penalize the intentional possession or delivery of
drugs, or the knowing possession or delivery of drugs; it punishes the
possession or delivery of drugs, however unintentional, however
unknowing."83 Like Judge Scriven, Judge Hirsch found the Florida leg-
islature's broad-sweeping criminalization troublingly wide.
The Washington court then turned to its point of departure from the
Anderson decision to consider whether the Shelton decision was binding
precedent. 84 Judge Hirsch, looking to both federalism and statutory con-
struction, found that the Shelton court did not engage in statutory con-
struction." Rather, it sought to resolve an apparent constitutionality
conflict between the twice-reiterated opinion of the Florida Supreme
Court and the reactionary amendment promulgated by the state legisla-
ture. "That, to be sure, is purely a question of federal law," wrote Judge
Hirsch, "and the Florida Supreme Court has 'recognize[d], of course,
that state courts are bound by federal court determinations of federal law
questions. 86 Accordingly, Judge Hirsch found the Shelton decision
binding on the Washington court, as well as all other Eleventh Circuit
courts, including the Anderson court.87
The Washington court rejected both the State and Anderson court's
rationale for discarding Shelton through the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in Dwyer. "For the proposition that, once Florida courts have
authoritatively construed a Florida statute, federal courts cannot deter-
mine whether that statute (thus construed) violates the federal Constitu-
tion, Dwyer will not serve."88 Instead, Dwyer "makes amply clear" that
Shelton is indeed binding on state courts because of their procedural
differences. 89 In Dwyer, the Florida Supreme Court found a statute
unconstitutional; soon after, a federal court then, in the absence of a
limiting construction, found the same statute unconstitutional.9" In
response, the Florida Supreme Court supplied the limiting construction,
barring any state court from finding the statute unconstitutional.9 '
Shelton, however, like Chicone and Scott, dealt with a statute for which
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Anderson was entered on August 11, 2011. and Washington was entered on August 17,
2011. Id.
85. See id. at 1129.








the Florida Supreme Court had supplied limiting constructions so the
statute would comply with constitutional Due Process. The legislature's
adverse reaction effectively voided the limiting constructions. Thus,
unlike Dwyer, the federal court in Shelton was continuing the judiciary's
power-balancing legacy of Chicone and Scott.
92
The Washington court acknowledged that although several of Flor-
ida's District Courts of Appeal considered the DAPCA issue, none
decided precisely whether the Act was unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause.93 Instead, higher courts merely glossed over the consti-
tutionality issue, deciding the cases on other grounds. In the absence of a
decision from the appellate courts on the Due Process claims against
DAPCA, the Washington court found itself bound to the Shelton conclu-
sion, achieved through the Staples tripartite analysis. 94
The Washington court took another bold step in evaluating the pol-
icy perspective behind the Act. "Even in those rare instances in which
the law creates and enforces strict liability crimes, choice is not taken
out of the equation entirely; it is simply more attenuated from the conse-
quence that the law seeks to prevent."95 Judge Hirsch offered the exam-
ple of a defendant convicted of drunk driving, who, choosing to drink
and subsequently choosing to drive, is punished for the injury his
choices cause, even if he never directly chose to cause the resulting
injury.96 He also posited the example of c-level executives who choose
to reap the rewards of traffic in hazardous wastes and are then punished
for the harm caused by the waste, even though the executives never
chose to cause that harm.97 Judge Hirsch analogized these situations to a
defendant who may be punished for the harm caused by the use of
cocaine, even though he never chose to cause the specific harm through
his choice to possess or deliver the substance. 98 Judge Hirsch contrasted
this essential element of choice with the broad trap set by the lack of
knowledge under DAPCA: "It reaches beyond those who willfully do
wrong, beyond those who negligently do wrong, beyond those who care-
lessly do wrong, and includes within its wingspan those who meant no
wrong." 99 The Washington court noted the importance of "what we
intend" as the "state of mind that distinguishes non-culpable from culpa-
92. See id.





98. See id. Similarly, Jimmy, this article's protagonist, may have chosen to temporarily
possess his brother Mike's car, but never actively chose to possess the contraband-containing
backpack, and certainly never chose to cause the harm the Valium pills may have caused.
99. Id.
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ble" behavior, and criticized DAPCA-and thus, the Florida legisla-
ture-for failing to make the same distinction.'00 Following in suit of
Shelton, Judge Hirsch ruled DAPCA unconstitutional as violative of Due
Process. l0l
Judge Hirsch also highlighted a revealing distinction between
DAPCA and Florida's trafficking statute, section 893.135.102 The traf-
ficking statute explicitly seeks to condemn one who "knowingly sells,
purchases, manufactures, or brings into this state" a controlled sub-
stance. 1 3 While the state does not have the burden of proving knowl-
edge for simple possession or delivery, it must prove knowledge beyond
a reasonable doubt in trafficking cases.
2. FLORIDA'S DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL:
SIDING AGAINST SHELTON
In October 2011, the First District Court of Appeal disregarded the
Shelton decision in deciding Flagg v. State.104 Isaac Flagg was stopped
in Gainesville for riding a bicycle without a light when police found
crack on his person. 10 5 Flagg was charged under DAPCA, pled guilty,
and was sentenced accordingly.' 06 On appeal and in light of Shelton,
Flagg argued his conviction was invalid under DAPCA's
unconstitutionality. 1
07
"We see no reason to recede from our settled precedent simply
because one federal judge has a different view of the law than this
court," announced the Flagg court.'0 8 Instead of analyzing the constitu-
tional issue, the Flagg court rejected Shelton's characterization of the
affirmative defense provision as its rationale for dissent: "[B]ecause lack
of knowledge is not a defense to a true strict liability crime, the availa-
bility of the affirmative defense. . . undermines the essential premise in
Shelton that the offenses in [DAPCA] are strict liability crimes" punish-
able as felonies.109 Further, the Flagg court avoided analyzing the con-
100. Id.
101. Id. "Like the court in Shelton, I find that Florida Statute § 893.13 is facially violative of
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution ....." Id.
102. Id. at 1134, n.6.
103. FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1997).
104. See Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
105. See id. at 139.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 140.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 141. The Flagg court also sought to reinforce the Second District's decision in
Adkins and promote the administration of justice statewide by citing Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d
665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (holding "in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind
all Florida trial courts."). Id.
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stitutional claim by noting that the Second District Court of Appeal
certified the issue to the Florida Supreme Court. By upholding
DAPCA's constitutionality and acknowledging its anticipation of the
Supreme Court's decision, the Flagg court "preserve[d] the status quo"
within the First District Court of Appeal. 110 Absent further guidance
from the Florida Supreme Court, defendants in the First District Court of
Appeal would not have the Shelton safeguard at their disposal.
One month later, the Fourth District Court of Appeal also refused to
address the constitutionality claims in Shelton. Like the Flagg court, the
court in Maestas v. State found Shelton's claim that DAPCA converted
drug offenses into strict liability crimes unpersuasive, instead holding
that the Act was constitutional, and "merely abrogated the additional
'knowledge of illicit nature' element" added by Chicone. 11 Like
Anderson, the Maestas court looked to Wright v. State and Burnette v.
State as controlling case law in declining to adopt the Shelton court's
ruling.
112
On September 28, 2011, the Second District Court of Appeal seized
the opportunity to certify the DAPCA issue to the state Supreme Court
through State v. Adkins:
Until this important constitutional question is resolved by the Florida
Supreme Court, prosecutions for drug offenses will be subject to
great uncertainty throughout Florida. Moreover, cases pending on
appeal and on motions for postconviction relief will be subject to
similar uncertainty. It will be difficult to reach a final resolution in
many of these cases until the issue is resolved. Finally, if the ruling in
this order is ultimately affirmed by the supreme court, it is possible
that hundreds or even thousands of inmates will be eligible for imme-
diate release.
113
The Second District Court of Appeal further emphasized that conflicting
interpretations of DAPCA "require[d] immediate resolution by the
Supreme Court because the issues are of great importance and will have
a great effect on the proper administration of justice throughout the
state.""' 4 The Second District Court of Appeal highlighted divergent
opinions across the state's circuit courts, noting that "this issue ... will
undoubtedly be raised in every felony division in all twenty circuits"
and, as illustrated in the Eleventh Circuit, that "it is clear from the...
above-cited cases that judges will take at least two different approaches
110. Id.
111. Maestas v. State, 76 So.3d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
112. See id. at 995.
113. See State v. Adkins, 71 So. 3d 184, 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
114. Id. at 185.
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to the issue."'" 5 The Adkins court asserted it was ill-suited to decide such
a crucial issue, which had been "fully briefed and thoroughly discussed"
in both the present case and its companion cases around the state.1 16 In
an effort to seek prompt statewide resolution to the DAPCA conflict and
relieve the backlog prompted by the Shelton opinion, the Adkins court
certified the issue with it sights set on a resolution to the Act's constitu-
tional question.
IV. LAW, PRACTICE, AND PRACTICALITY
The potential changes in Florida's criminal code sparked by
Shelton affect petitioners, practitioners, and judiciary actors alike.
Administratively, the Shelton opinion prompted an onslaught of
motions and appeals from defendants around the state who now con-
tended their convictions under DAPCA were unconstitutional. This sud-
den Achilles' heel to judicial efficiency posed a threat to the timely
disposal of an already crowded docket. In his Washington opinion,
Judge Hirsch noted that the thirty-nine defendants at issue "are unwor-
thy, utterly unworthy, of this windfall exoneration," but reconciled his
decision with the words of Justice Frankfurter: "History bears testimony
that by such disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at
first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.""' 7
Like the Washington court, the Flagg court underscored the upset
in the Florida justice system caused by Shelton." 8 It called for the need
of "an expeditious decision from the Supreme Court addressing
[DAPCA's] constitutionality" to "promote the consistent administration
of justice by resolving the issue for the trial courts, thereby allowing
drug prosecutions to proceed."1 19 The Adkins court echoed the sheer
numerical need for resolution of the issue, citing the possibility that
"hundreds or even thousands of inmates [would] be eligible for immedi-
ate release" upon the Act's reversal.' 0 Undoubtedly, judges and defend-
ants around the state eagerly awaited the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Adkins.
In a brief filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, Florida attorneys amplified the practitioner's perspective for
prompt adjudication of DAPCA's constitutionality. They began by rec-
ognizing the threat posed by DAPCA to the integrity of Florida law:
115. Id.
116. Id. at 186.
117. Washington, supra note 2 at 1133 (quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597
(1946) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)).
118. See Flagg, 74 So. 3d at 141.
119. Id.
120. Adkins, 71 So. 3d at 185.
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"[S]o sweeping is Florida's elimination of the mens rea requirement for
this offense that it patently contravenes the stated 'General Purposes' of
the entire Florida Criminal Code." 12 ' The briefs authors alleged that
DAPCA failed to give adequate warning to those charged of the nature
of the conduct proscribed, was impermissibly vague in defining the
material elements of the charged offense, and simply did not adequately
safeguard "conduct that is without fault or legitimate state interest from
being condemned as criminal."' 2 2 The briefs authors reject the State's
contention that the State would never apply the statute in such a
situation. 123
Further, the briefs authors echo sentiments in Shelton and Wash-
ington, espousing the floodgates argument: "[I]f this court finds consti-
tutional a strict liability statute under which draconian prison sentences
are available, there is nothing to prevent future legislatures from under-
taking a sweeping, wholesale elimination of any mens rea requirements
in their criminal law." In addition to cautioning the Court on the chip-
ping away of rights, the practitioners characterize the penalties imposed
by DAPCA, without proof of a culpable mental state, as "offen[ding]
fundamental notions of justice." 124
Under DAPCA, potential defendants are faced not only with up to
thirty years imprisonment and a felony conviction, but are also tasked
with "an unreasonable duty in terms of a person's responsibility to
ascertain the relevant facts."' 25 If Jimmy, this article's opening protago-
nist, was delivering a sealed envelope from a teacher to the school prin-
cipal's office-an envelope that contained, amongst legitimate papers, a
small bag of cocaine or a few painkillers without the proper prescrip-
tion-he cannot be expected to break the seal to inspect the package as a
precaution to avoid potential criminal charges. Similarly, in borrowing
his older brother's car, he cannot be expected to conduct a detailed
sweep for illegal substances before making his way to school.
In this sense, DAPCA does not protect public welfare; it threatens
the very interactions that make the American public free to associate
without fear of unpredictable criminal consequence. "Wholly passive,
innocent, or no conduct whatsoever ... is precisely what the State of
Florida has permitted to be targeted by the stripping of any mens rea
121. Brief for Luke Jarrod Adkins, et al. at 7, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, State v.
Adkins, (Fla. S. Ct.) (November 28, 2011) (No. SCI 1-1878).
122. Id. The brief's authors employ the following example: Under DAPCA, the law finds
guilty the "wholly innocent conduct" of a postal worker who delivers a mailed package containing
a controlled substance. Id.
123. Id. at n.2.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id. at 13.
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requirement at all from its controlled substance law."1 2 6 The brief's
authors further characterize DAPCA as "an atavistic throwback to the
barbarism of the dark ages" and "repugnant to the civilized common law
as understood by American lawyers and the nation's founders in
1787. ' 127
V. DEATH TO DAPCA
The Florida Supreme Court accepted the Second District Court of
Appeal's invitation to dance with DAPCA once again. 128 On December
6, 2011, the Florida Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of
State v. Adkins.1 29 As the old adage goes, "the third time's a charm," and
following Chicone and Scott, Adkins marked the Florida Supreme
Court's third encounter with the provisions of Florida's possession and
delivery of controlled substance laws. Following oral arguments,
defendants, advocates, and other interested parties statewide awaited the
Florida Supreme Court's decision for eight months. On July 12, 2012,
the Florida Supreme Court announced its decision: DAPCA was wholly
constitutional.1 30 This section addresses the four factors necessitating an
expeditious and definitive decision on DAPCA's constitutionality, ana-
lyzes the Florida Supreme Court's erroneous decision in upholding the
statute, and underscores why the Court should have dealt DAPCA a fatal
blow.
A. Four Factors for Finality
Four primary factors revealed that the time was ripe for the Court to
announce a game-changing decision. First, the deluge of cases and
cross-circuit controversy brought about by the Shelton decision in such a
short period of time denoted the importance of the Act's constitutional-
ity as perceived by both the state's judicial actors and its prosecution and
defense advocates.
Second, the issue's third appearance in the state's Supreme Court,
complemented by the legislature's hasty 2002 amendment, underscored
the desperate need for definitive resolution on the necessity of a mens
rea requirement, and a final end to a seemingly childish contest by the
state legislature to circumscribe the interpretive authority of the judici-
ary. Before the Supreme Court decision, District Courts of Appeal
126. Brief for Adkins, et al., supra note 122, at 16.
127. Id. at 20.
128. Adkins, supra note 5.
129. News Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Florida Supreme Court Hears
Argument on State's Strict Liability Felony Drug Law (December 6, 2011) (available at http:I/
www.nacdl.org/NewsReleases.aspx?id=23222&libID=23192).
130. Adkins, supra note 5.
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remained visibly timid to tackle the constitutionality issue, but were
vocal in skirting-or at a bare minimum, acknowledging-its existence.
This silent cry for help from District Courts further amplified the need
for guidance from the State's highest court.
Third, thousands of defendants and their families, those actually
touched by the Act's provisions, awaited adjudication of their potential
exoneration. Both the systematic and practical stress exerted by the fig-
urative hold placed on cases pending a decision on the DAPCA issue
was fundamentally unfair to the very people affected most by the statute.
Lastly, 2012 is an election year. The Court's decision on DAPCA
will undoubtedly prompt important dialogue amongst candidates and
incumbents on alternative, less offensive, and more effective means of
punishing those truly knowingly guilty of possessing and delivering
criminalized substances.
In light of these four factors, the Supreme Court should have sen-
tenced DAPCA's elimination of a mens rea requirement to death once
and for all. The Court should have championed and mandated the inclu-
sion of a mens rea requirement. Amongst other consequences, holding
otherwise triggers the fear that the Court might grant the legislature the
green light to remove previously established mens rea elements in other
state statutes.
B. A Statute Spared, Erroneously
The Florida Supreme Court did an about-face with Adkins, chang-
ing course from its earlier espousal of a inens rea requirement in
Chicone and Scott. This time, the Court sided with the legislature in
ruling DAPCA constitutional.
The Florida Supreme Court began its decision in Adkins by chroni-
cling its own history with DAPCA, including its espousal of mens rea as
a "necessary element" in Chicone and the knowledge of both presence
and illicit nature as required under Scott.13 1 It recognized the legisla-
ture's response in the form of the 2002 amendment, then cited rulings
from each of the state's five District Courts of Appeal holding DAPCA
did not violate the requirements of Due Process. 32 At the circuit court
level, State v. Adkins cited Shelton as persuasive, non-binding authority
that DAPCA was indeed unconstitutional.133 The Second District Court
of Appeal quickly certified the case to the Florida Supreme Court.134
In using Adkins as a vehicle to rule DAPCA constitutional, the
131. Adkins, supra note 5, at *1-2.
132. Id. at *2.
133. See id.
134. Adkins, 71 So. 3d at 186.
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Florida Supreme Court looked to three sources: First, the legislature's
"broad authority" to define the elements of criminal offenses; second,
case law recognizing that "due process ordinarily does not preclude the
creation of an offense without a guilty knowledge element"; and third,
situations when the absence of a guilty knowledge element constituted a
violation of due process. 35 The Court, in a stark departure from Chicone
and Scott, employed caselaw dating back nearly three decades in defer-
ring to the discretion of the state legislature:
It is within the power of the legislature to declare conduct criminal
without requiring specific criminal intent to achieve a certain result;
that is, the legislature may punish conduct without regard to the
mental attitude of the offender, so that the general intent of the
accused to do the act is deemed to give rise to a presumption of intent
to achieve the criminal result. The legislature may also dispense with
a requirement that the actor be aware of the facts making his conduct
criminal. 
1 36
The Court openly subjected itself to the whims of the state legisla-
ture. The Court did, however, acknowledge situations where the elimina-
tion of a scienter element offended Due Process, including criminalizing
entirely passive conduct, 137 criminalizing conduct protected by the First
Amendment, 38 and when innocuous conduct is criminalized by a statute
whose means is not rationally related to its purposes. 139 Here, the Court
failed to find that conduct governed by DAPCA "amount[ed] to essen-
tially innocent conduct"; instead, the Court defended the statute as
"rationally related to the Legislature's goal of controlling substances that
have a high potential for abuse."14 The Court denied any possible
impingement on constitutionally protected freedoms: "[T]here is no con-
stitutional right to possess contraband." 14 ' "Nor," the Court continued,
"is there a protected right to be ignorant of the nature of the property in
135. Adkins, supra note 5, at *3.
136. Id. at *5, citing State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816, 819 (Fla. 1983).
137. Adkins, supra note 5, at *6. In State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 2004), the Florida
Supreme Court held that the State was required to prove that a sex offender knew of the
requirement to register before being held criminally liable for failing to comply with the state's
registration requirements.
138. Adkins, supra note 5, at *6, citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that a
scienter element was required in an ordinance criminalizing the possession of obscene or indecent
writing in places of business where books are sold).
139. Adkins, supra note 5, at *6, citing Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991) (holding
that a Florida statute criminalizing possession of depictions of physical contact with a minor
person's clothed or unclothed genitals violated Due Process in rendering wholly innocent family
photographs of caretaker-child conduct a felony).
140. Adkins, supra note 5, at *7.
141. Id. at *8.
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one's possession." '142 Championing the role of common sense, the
Supreme Court looked to the Middle District's decision in Bunton to
declare that "possession without awareness of the illicit nature of the
substance is highly unusual." '143
The Florida Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of the
affirmative defense available to defendants. "The affirmative defense
does not ask the defendant to disprove something that the State must
prove in order to convict, but instead provides a defendant with an
opportunity to explain why his or her admittedly illegal conduct should
not be punished."'" The Court rationalized the remedy of an "opportu-
nity to explain" as constitutionally appropriate by isolating the legisla-
ture's goal in curtailing the sale, manufacture, delivery, and possession
of substances from the defendant's "subjective intent" in engaging in
such conduct.145 Yet this separation between conduct and intent amounts
to an assertion that intent, thoughts, and motivation bear no consequence
on actions. 4 6 Rather than consider the plausible situation of inadvertent
possession, the Court brushes aside the importance of innocent victims,
and simply points to the affirmative defense as the sole curative
measure. 1
47
C. Death to DAPCA, Revisited
Striking down DAPCA would have sent a strong, cautionary, and
disciplinary message to the state legislature-that it must balance its
broad discretion with constitutional rights afforded to citizens. Casting
aside the majority's "foundation of flawed common sense," Justice
Perry's dissent reached the correct decision in declaring that the major-
ity's opinion "shatter[ed] bedrock constitutional principles."' 48 In a
practical, real-life approach, Justice Perry looked to the everyday exam-
ples of possession and delivery cited in Washington and Shelton, and
included other anecdotes from Adkins:
142. Id.
143. Id. "Just as 'common sense and experience' dictate that a person in possession of
Treasury checks addressed to another person should be 'aware of the high probability that the
checks were stolen, a person in possession of a controlled substance should be aware of the nature
of the substance as an illegal drug." Id., quoting Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845
(1973). The Court also links the supposedly obvious value of contraband to a common sense
awareness of its presence: "Because controlled substances are valuable, common sense indicates
that they are generally handled with care." Id. at *8.
144. Id. at *9.
145. Id.
146. Imagine if motive was declared independent of evidentiary analysis! This would surely
prompt a worldwide Wigmorean uproar.
147. Adkins, supra note 5, at *10.
148. Id. at *17.
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a letter carrier who delivers a package containing unprescribed
Adderall; a roommate who is unaware that the person who shares his
apartment has hidden illegal drugs in the common areas of the home;
a mother who carries a prescription pill bottle in her purse, unaware
that the pills have been substituted for illegally obtained drugs by her
teenage daughter, who placed them in the bottle to avoid detection.149
Justice Perry posited more examples of his own:
a driver who rents a car in which a past passenger accidentally
dropped a baggie of marijuana under the seat; a traveler who mistak-
enly retrieves from a luggage carousel a bag identical to her own
containing Oxycodone; a helpful college student who drives a carload
of a friend's possessions to the friend's new apartment, unaware that
a stash of heroin is tucked within those possessions; an ex-wife who
is framed by an ex-husband who planted cocaine in her home in an
effort to get the upper hand in a bitter custody dispute.15 °
The possibilities are, indeed, "endless," and applicable to more innocent
citizens than contemplated by the majority.1 5 ' The number, variety, and
plausibility of these everyday occurrences not only underscore
DAPCA's impermissibly wide scope, but also destroy the majority's
characterization of the statute's criminalization of innocent conduct as
"unusual." 152
The dissent recognizes the difficulty of employing the statutorily
afforded affirmative defense: "[It] is hardly a friendly opportunity;
rather, it is an onerous burden that strips defendants-including genu-
inely innocent defendants-of their constitutional presumption of inno-
cence."' 53 The dissent analyzed the Hobson's Choice discussed in Part
III.A, supra, in recognizing the difficulties faced by an innocent defen-
dant who must not only prove his affirmative defense, but also face a
jury instructed on the permissive presumption of knowledge.154 In
adopting the stance assumed by Shelton, Washington, and other deci-
sions statewide declaring DAPCA unconstitutional, the dissent con-
cluded with a powerful rejection of the majority's decision: "The
majority opinion sets alarming precedent, both in the context of section
893.13 and beyond. It makes neither legal nor common sense to me,
offends all notions of due process, and threatens core principles of the
149. Id. at *18.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *10.
153. Id. at *19. Justice Perry cites Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895), in calling
this presumption "axiomatic," "elementary," and core to "the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law." Id.
154. Id. at *20.
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presumption of innocence and burden of proof."' 55 Accordingly, in the
best interests of Floridians, DAPCA deserved to die.
VI. CONCLUSION
The criminalizing net cast by DAPCA is simply too wide, too
unfair, too unclear, and wholly unconstitutional. The fruits of the current
Act cannot be championed as victories in the war against drugs, but
rather as successes in a climate where the chances of unconstitutional
conviction are high. Striking down DAPCA and mandating a mens rea
requirement is healthy for all actors involved: judges are relieved from
choosing to side with a certain court or state legislatures and can
promptly adjudicate pending claims, prosecutors have a clear set of ele-
ments of a crime which they must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and
those awaiting criminal proceedings are aware of the precise constitu-
tional protections and remedies available.
Systematic concerns aside, the constitutionality of the Act can be
reduced to the fundamental American principle of fairness. Yet, the
Florida Supreme Court shirked its responsibility to restore the state's
citizens' freedom of contact without fear of criminal misconduct, so that
stories like that of Jimmy, the innocent student facing conviction with-
out consideration of mens rea, remain just that-distant hypotheticals,
not the Due Process-denying reality of a faulty, facially unconstitutional
state statute.
155. Id. at *21.
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